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Abstract 
Over the past years, several countries around the world have adopted a system of prudential 
prompt corrective action (PCA). The European Union countries are being encouraged to 
adopt PCA by policy analysts who explicitly call for its adoption. To date, most of the 
discussion on PCA has focused on its overall merits. This paper focuses on the 
preconditions needed for the adoption of an effective PCA. These preconditions include 
conceptual elements such as a prudential supervisory focus on minimizing deposit insurance 
losses and mandating supervisory action as capital declines. These preconditions also 
include institutional aspects such as greater supervisory independence and authority, more 
effective resolution mechanisms and better methods of measuring capital. 
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Introduction 
Over the past years, Japan, Korea and, more recently Mexico have adopted a system of 
predetermined capital/asset ratios that trigger structured actions by the supervisor inspired by 
Benston and Kaufman’s (1988) proposal for structured early intervention and resolution 
(SEIR), a version of which was adopted by the US as prompt corrective action (PCA) in the 
1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA).1  In all these 
countries, authorities must resolve the bank through sale, merger or liquidation at a 
predetermined minimum regulatory capital ratio.  The positive effect of FDICIA in creating the 
appropriate incentives for banks, the deposit insurer and the prudential supervisor is reflected 
in the increasing number of recommendations to introduce PCA type provisions in other 
countries.  Goldstein (1997) presents a case for an international banking standard in which 
one of the key operational issues is an incentive compatible safety net and prudential 
supervision whose principles are inspired in FDCIA-like features to combat moral hazard and 
supervisory forbearance.2  In emerging economies, Goldstein and Turner (1996) propose PCA 
as a policy aimed at improving incentives for bank owners, managers and creditors as well as 
bank supervisors.3  
Against the background of the launching of the Euro and the expectation of a 
gradual increase in cross border banking activity in the EU, the European Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) made a proposal aimed at dealing with problem banks.4  One 
of the recommendations in their proposal was to establish a SEIR regime that call for 
predictable supervisory action in cases of excessive risk taking.  More recently, the ESFRC 
argues that implementation of PCA in each individual Member State would contribute to host 
country supervisors’ trust in home country supervisors.5  Benink and Benston (2005) also 
propose SEIR as a mechanism to protect deposit insurance funds and tax payers from losses 
in the EU as part of a more broad based regulatory reform.6  Along similar lines, Mayes (2005) 
proposes intervention at prescribed benchmarks (ideally above economic insolvency) as a 
measure to have plausible bank exit policies for systemic risk banks in the EU.7 
The literature and the proposals to implement SEIR/PCA have mainly focused on 
certain aspects of its economic rationality and little attention has been paid to the 
preconditions for its successful implementation.  However, the institutional framework at 
the time of the adoption of PCA in the US was very different from the institutional framework 
of prudential supervision and deposit insurance in other countries. PCA was adopted in order 
to make bank supervision more effective in reducing deposit insurance losses.  Before PCA 
can be successfully adopted, policy makers need to evaluate the merits of several important 
                                                                          
1. Benston, George J., and George G. Kaufman (1998). Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depositor Institutions: Past 
Policies and Current Options, New York: Salomon Brothers Center, Graduate School of Business, New York University. 
2. Goldstein, M. (1997). The case for an International Banking Standard, Policy Analyses in International Economics 
No. 47 April. 
3. Goldstein, M., and Phillip Turner (1996). Banking crises in emerging economies: origins and policy options, BIS 
Economic Papers No. 46, October. 
4. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 1, Dealing with problem banks in Europe, Center 
for Economic Policy Studies, 22 June, 1998. 
5. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 23, Reforming Banking Supervision in Europe, 21 
November 2005. 
6. Benink, H., and George J. Benston (2005). The future of banking regulation in developed countries: Lessons from and 
for Europe, Mimeo. 
7. Mayes, D. (2005). Implications of Basle II for the European Financial System, Presentation at the Center for European 
Policy Studies. 
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characteristics of the US bank supervisory system in addition to evaluating the merits of PCA 
within a US style supervision system.  
The purpose of this article is two-fold:  (1) to identify and evaluate key conceptual 
approaches and institutional structures needed for PCA to be effective, and (2) identify the 
changes needed to adopt an effective version of PCA in general and, in particular, in Europe.  
In order to better understand what is required for an effective PCA, the first part of this paper 
considers PCA’s roots, especially focusing on the origins of PCA in the US, the reasons why 
the US adopted PCA and the US experience under PCA.  The second part considers the 
major conceptual changes that PCA brought to US bank supervision and the extent to which 
these would represent changes for European bank supervision.  The next section focuses on 
the institutional preconditions for a successful implementation of PCA.  The last part provides 
summary remarks. As the paper’s objective is to stimulate discussion, it focuses on 
presenting the economic arguments.   
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1 The US Experience 
1.1 Prompt Corrective Action:  Creating the conditions for passage 
Prompt corrective action (PCA) was part of package of measures adopted with the 1991 
passage of FDICIA.  The problems that lead to FDICIA were revealed in the late 1970s-early 
1980s as US monetary policy tightened to slow the rate of price inflation, and the resulting 
high interest rates and reduced inflation produced large losses at thrifts and many banks.  
These losses caused economic insolvencies at the so-called “zombie” thrifts that were not 
resolved until the late 1980s.8  Throughout most of the 1980s, the US thrift supervisors and 
Congress compounded the inability of historic cost accounting to recognize 
interest-rate-related losses with changes in regulations that gave an additional artificial boost 
to thrifts’ supervisory capital ratios as well as reducing the required levels of those ratios.  
The bank supervisors’ response to large banks’ already low capital ratios and 
the further losses on less developed countries (LDCs) loans was mixed.  On the one hand, the 
supervisors did not require and in some cases even discouraged recognition of the losses on 
LDCs loans.  On the other hand, they implemented numerical capital adequacy requirements 
that forced many of the largest banks to issue new capital.9  Moreover, the bank supervisors 
effectively nationalized one of the largest banks, Continental Illinois, in response to domestic 
loan losses and resolved hundreds of smaller banks that became insolvent, primarily in energy 
producing and agricultural areas.10 
After years of supervisory and congressional and administration denial of thrift 
insolvency problems, Congress moved to address the problem, appropriating $10.875 billion 
in 1987 and additional $132 billion in 1989.11  Shortly thereafter, new problems emerged in 
the credit quality of many large commercial banks’ loan portfolios, especially their loans to the 
commercial real estate sector.  By the early 1990s, the combination of a depleted insurance 
fund due to past failed bank resolutions and the threat of additional losses due to new 
insolvencies led some to predict that Congress would be required to make another large 
appropriation of funds.12  In 1991 the Congress moved to limit taxpayer exposure to losses at 
failed banks with the passage of FDICIA.  The PCA provisions of FDICIA create a structured 
                                                                          
8. Kane, Edward J. (1985).  The Gathering Crisis in Deposit Insurance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,  provides an early 
discussion of the thrift problem.  The banking problems of the 1980s, are summarized with an extensive literature review 
in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997), History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future. Volume 1: An 
Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington 
D.C. 167-188. Also available at <http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol1.html>. Chapter 4 of Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (1997) addresses the thrift problems. 
9. Wall, Larry D. (1989). "Capital Requirements for Banks: A Look at the 1981 and 1988 Standards", Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, (March/April) 14-29. 
10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (ref. 8 above) discusses Continental Illinois failure in Chapter 7, the problems 
of banks that served agricultural areas in Chapter 8 and the problems of banks in the Southwestern U.S. (the primary 
energy producing region) in Chapter 9. 
11. See Chapters 2 and 4 of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (ref. 8 above) for a discussion of the 1987 and 1989 
legislative acts. 
12. Note: the US has separate insurance funds for commercial banks and savings associations (thrifts).  For discussion 
of the condition of the FDIC’s insurance fund in 1991 see Garcia, Gillian (1991). "The condition of the Bank Insurance 
Fund: a view from Washington", Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago. pp. 50-69. Litan, Robert E. (1991), "Short and long snapshots of the U.S. banking industry", 
Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. pp. 70-86.  
Bartholomew, Philip F., and Thomas J. Lutton (1991). "Assessing the condition of the Bank Insurance Fund", 
Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. pp. 87-111, and 
Bovenzi, John F. (1991). "BIF: still solvent after all these years?" Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 112-121. 
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system of supervisory responses to declines in bank capital, culminating in the bank being 
forced into receivership within 90 days after its tangible equity capital dropped below two 
percent of total assets.13 
1.2 Intellectual history 
The US has a long history with the basics required to implement PCA:  binding capital 
adequacy standards and the ability to take substantial actions against banks that failed to 
meet the standards.  The supervisors had the authority to adopt many of the provisions of 
PCA using their pre-existing powers if they had so chosen.14  However, the experience of the 
1980s had clearly indicated that US supervisors valued discretionary responses targeted at 
keeping some banks (especially thrifts and large banks) in operation after they had became 
financially distressed. 
Benston and Kaufman (1988) developed a system of mandatory responses to 
changes in capital with a proposal they came to call structured early intervention and 
resolution (SEIR).15  One way that this proposal could work is illustrated in Table 2 of Benston 
and Kaufman (1988, p. 64) in which they propose that banks be placed in one of four 
categories or tranches:  1)  “No problem,” 2) “Potential problems” that would be subject to 
more intensive supervision and regulation, 3)  “Problem intensive” that would face even more 
intensive supervision and regulation with mandatory suspension of dividends and 4) 
“Reorganization mandatory” with ownership of these banks automatically transferred to the 
deposit insurer.  Although the deposit insurer would assume control of the bank, Benston and 
Kaufman (1988, p. 68) ordinarily would have the bank continue in operation under the 
temporary control of the FDIC, or be sold to another bank with liquidation only as a “last 
resort.”  The deposit insurer would remain at risk under SEIR, but only to the extent of 
covering losses to insured depositors.  However, Benston and Kaufman did not expect such 
a takeover to be necessary, except when a bank’s capital was depleted before the 
supervisors could act, perhaps as a result of a massive undetected fraud.  Because 
the bank’s owners would realize that the supervisors were mandated to take over a bank 
while it was solvent (3 percent market value of capital-to-asset ratio), the owners had strong 
incentives to recapitalize, sell, or liquidate the bank rather than put it to the FDIC.16   
1.3 Adoption in FDICIA 
Congress adopted a variant of SEIR in 1991 with the inclusion of the PCA provisions in the 
FDICIA.17 PCA creates five capital categories for banks: well capitalized, adequately 
                                                                          
13. The supervisors can take other actions if such actions would better achieve the goal of the act. 
14. For an argument that supervisors routinely imposed many of the restrictions contained in FDICIA prior to its adoption 
see Gilbert, Alton R. (1991).  "Supervision of undercapitalized banks: is there a case for change?", Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. (May) pp. 16-30. 
15. See Benston, George J., and George G. Kaufman (1988) in ref. 1 above.  For a discussion of the intellectual history 
of PCA see Benston, G., and Kaufman, G. (1994). "The Intellectual History of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991", In G. G. Kaufman (ed.) Reforming Financial Institutions and Markets in the United States, 
pp. 1-17, Boston: Kluwer. 
16. Table 2 in Benston and Kaufman (1998) gives “Illustrative Reorganization Rules” with mandatory reorganization at a 3 
percent market value of capital-to-asset ratio.  However, the text talks about possibility that this ratio should be revised 
up. 
17. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) also includes significant changes in the way 
deposit insurance premiums are charged and the way the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolves failed 
banks (see Chapter 2 of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997) for a brief summary of the deposit insurance 
reform parts of FDICIA.  For a more detailed discussion of least cost resolution —especially as applied to the largest US 
banks) see Wall, Larry D. (1993).  "Too-Big-To-Fail' After FDICIA", Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
(January/February), pp. 1-14.  
FDICIA replaced the flat-rate deposit insurance premiums that banks had paid since the FDIC was created with risk-
based premiums.  In practice, the risk measure used to set the premiums is crude, but it is nevertheless substantially 
more accurate than charging all banks a flat rate on deposits.  The change in the way the FDIC resolves banks was 
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capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized.18  
Congress ordered the supervisory agencies to set minimum requirements for a bank to be 
classified in each of the top four capital categories, with the constraint that a bank must 
be classified as critically undercapitalized if it has a tangible accounting equity-capital-to-asset 
ratio of less than 2 percent.  Congress further required that the minimum requirements for 
each category must include both minimum leverage requirement and a minimum risk-based 
capital requirement.  Unlike the Benston and Kaufman´s (1988) proposal, the supervisory 
standards include both minimum tier one (equity capital) and total capital (including 
subordinated debt) requirements for each category.  The original SEIR proposal would only 
have set a minimum total capital requirement for each category but SEIR would have required 
higher levels of capital. 
Unlike SEIR, PCA distinguishes between well capitalized and adequately capitalized 
banks, albeit the difference in supervisory treatment is small.  However, the set of supervisory 
actions under PCA, both mandatory and discretionary, is substantially greater than that 
sketched out in SEIR.  No bank may make a capital distribution (dividend or stock 
repurchase) if after the payment the bank would fall in any of the three undercapitalized 
categories unless the bank has prior supervisory approval.  All undercapitalized banks must 
submit a capital restoration plan and that plan must be approved by the bank’s supervisor.  
All undercapitalized banks also face growth restrictions.  Significantly undercapitalized banks 
must restrict bonuses and raises to management.  Critically undercapitalized banks must be 
placed in receivership within 90 days unless some other action would better minimize the 
long-run losses to the deposit insurance fund.  Supervisors are also given a variety of 
discretionary actions they may take.  For example, the supervisors may dismiss any director 
or senior officer at a significantly undercapitalized bank and may further require that their 
successor be approved by the supervisory agency. 
1.4 Analysis of the US PCA 
On first appearances, the adoption of PCA in the US appears to have been extremely 
successful.  Predictions that US bank failures would force the US Congress to appropriate 
additional money so that the FDIC could resolve failing banks were not borne out.  Instead, 
the US bank failure rate fell dramatically during the 1990s, with, for example, only one bank 
failing in 1997.  Indeed, not only did bank failures not drain the fund, but banks paid sufficient 
insurance premiums to rebuild the insurance fund and over the same period raise their capital 
adequacy ratios to the point where almost all banks (including virtually all large banks) are 
currently classified as well capitalized.19 
Although the banking industry’s performance was very impressive during the 1990s, 
a closer reading of the record reveals that a variety of factors are responsible for the 
improvement  Another clearly important factor in the turnaround was the relatively strong 
                                                                                                                                                 
contained in language ordering the agency to resolve banks in the way least costly to the insurance fund.  Prior to 
FDICIA, the FDIC used a cost test in its bank resolutions but applied the test in a way that  had the effect of almost 
always providing 100 percent deposit insurance for deposits exceeding the de jure coverage limit of $100,000.  FDICIA 
ordered a change in the cost test that would restrict coverage to $100,000 in almost all cases. 
18. PCA does not apply to the corporate owners of banks or their non-bank affiliates.  However, the bank subsidiaries 
are the dominant assets of almost all holding companies that own banks.  As such, the failure of the banking within the 
group is likely to trigger the failure of the holding company. 
19. Moreover, the US supervisors set the requirements to be classified as well capitalized under PCA above the 
minimum requirements set by Basel 1.  Well capitalized banks must have a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of 5 %, a total 
risk-based capital ratio of 10% and must also meet a minimum leverage (equity capital to total assets) requirement. 
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economic conditions that prevailed in the US during the 1990s.  Moreover, in some important 
respects one could argue that PCA has not yet been adequately tested.  In particular, none of 
the largest US banks suffered sufficiently large losses to the point where the bank should 
have been classified as undercapitalized.  
Although the performance of the banking industry may not be sufficient to clarify the 
impact of PCA, its likely long-run impact may be evaluated by looking at two issues:  (1) 
would PCA have prevented some of the mistakes in the 1980s and (2) are the supervisors 
implementing PCA in a way that suggests supervisors will behave differently next time the US 
banking system is under stress?  The extent to which PCA would have reduced the problems 
in the 1980s is unclear.  The supervisors took a variety of measures designed to make failing 
depositories look better and to allow supervisory forbearance including failing to include 
interest rate risk losses in their measures of regulatory capital, failing to require large banks to 
recognize loan losses to LDCs, and, lowering thrift capital standards and changing 
accounting policy to allow thrifts to report higher capital,  PCA would not have forced the 
supervisors into more timely recognition of interest rate or credit risk problems.  Further, PCA 
would have had only a limited impact on the lowering of capital standards, as the supervisors 
have discretion over all of the capital requirements except for the two percent tangible equity 
to assets ratio used to classify banks as critically undercapitalized.  Where PCA would 
unquestionably have been effective is in preventing the thrift regulators from adopting 
regulatory accounting principles that were weaker than generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) used for financial reporting by US nonfinancial firms, albeit PCA could not 
have prevented Congress from adopting measures that weaken GAAP as it did with net 
worth certificates.20 
The difficult part to judge of FDICIA is its provisions to discourage supervisory 
forbearance.  PCA requires that the inspector general of the appropriate supervisory agency 
prepare a report whenever a bank failure results in material losses.  The report addresses why 
the loss occurred and what should be done to prevent such losses in the future. A copy 
of the report is to be provided to the Comptroller General and to any member of Congress 
requesting the report.21   FDICIA also provides for public release of the reports upon request, 
but such requests are generally unnecessary as these reports are typically posted on 
agencies’ web site.22  One effect of such a report would be to subject the supervisory agency 
to additional "ex post" Congressional, media, banks and academic scrutiny.23 Also, the 
reports often contain recommendations to avoid future losses, recommendations that both 
provide the supervisors with a chance to learn from their mistakes and create the potential for 
increased accountability after future failures if the supervisors fail to implement appropriate 
changes.  
The effect of the change in incentives may be seen by looking at the implementation 
of FDICIA, both how the Act was implemented at small banks that did fail and in the 
preparation for dealing with large banks when one of them becomes distressed.  The good 
news in the implementation of FDICIA is that the FDIC is enforcing least cost resolution and 
                                                                          
20. Section 37 of FDICIA.  SEIR would have imposed even stricter requirements on regulatory accounting, mandating 
the use of market values in the calculation of capital ratios.  
21. The Comptroller General is the head of the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of the US Congress.  
22. For example, the FDIC Office of Inspector General’s report on material losses incurred at South Pacific Bank may be 
found at <http://www.fdicig.gov/reports03/03-036-508.shtml>. In discussing the role of PCA, the report states: 
“However, PCA was not fully effective due to the inadequate provision for loan losses that overstated SPB’s income and 
capital for several years.”  
23. Canada is the only other country in the OECD where the Office of the Auditor General does have similar 
responsibilities regarding the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (see www.oag-bvg.gc.ca).  
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that the inspector generals of the respective agencies are carrying through on their 
responsibility to review material loss cases.  The bad news is that the bank supervisory 
agencies do not appear to have worked to implement the intent of PCA.  PCA encouraged 
(and SEIR would require) market value accounting which the US supervisors have not sought 
to implement.   Moreover, if PCA was being faithfully implemented, any losses on recent bank 
failures would have been small.  Yet Eisenbeis and Wall (2002) find that the losses at the 
banks that have failed after FDICIA are still substantially larger than should have occurred if 
the bank supervisors had followed the spirit of PCA.24 
                                                                          
24. Eisenbeis, Robert A., and Larry D. Wall (2002). "The Major Supervisory Initiatives Post-FCICIA: Are They Based on 
the Goals of PCA?  Should They Be?", in Prompt Corrective Action in Banking: 10 Years Later, edited by George 
Kaufman, pp. 109-142.  This book is volume 14 of Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy, published 
by JAI. 
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2 Conceptual Issues in Adopting PCA 
SEIR and PCA are based on a clear philosophy of the role of bank supervisors that of 
minimizing deposit insurance losses.  This philosophy is in many ways different from that 
which guided the establishment of most bank supervisory authorities in general and in Europe 
in particular.  An effective system of PCA may be established without accepting all of the 
philosophy underlying SEIR; for example one can view bank supervision as having legitimate 
functions beyond protecting the deposit insurer, unlike Benston and Kaufman (1988).  
However, in order to have a fully effective system of PCA, the banking supervisory system has 
to incorporate some key elements of the SEIR/PCA philosophy.  The following subsections 
analyze three key elements of that philosophy. 
The first of those elements, that bank prudential supervisor’s primary focus should 
be on protecting the deposit insurance fund and minimizing government losses is discussed 
in the first section.  The second core element, that supervisors should have a clear set of 
required actions to be taken as a bank becomes progressively more undercapitalized, is 
discussed in the second section.  A controversial third part of SEIR/PCA, that 
undercapitalized banks should be closed before the economic value of their capital becomes 
negative, flows from the two core elements but is sufficiently controversial to merit discussion 
in the third subsection. 
2.1 Should supervisor’s goal be to minimize government losses? 
Both SEIR and PCA give prudential supervisors a single goal in carrying out their provisions, 
to limit government losses, rather than a list of public policy concerns to be addressed as a 
part of their prudential supervision (i.e. efficiency and competitiveness of the financial 
system).25  The rational for this choice is two-fold.  The standard motivation for focusing on 
limiting losses is that bank failures have imposed large losses on taxpayers in systems that 
have not followed SEIR.  However, a more compelling motivation is to reduce the 
misallocation of resources that arises from banks facing the dual problems of having distorted 
incentives for managers and owners, and being run by inefficient managers.26 This approach 
contrasts with the rational for adopting PCA in other countries where PCA is aimed at 
restoring prudential supervisors’ institutional credibility by ensuring strict enforcement of 
prudential requirements (see the case of Mexico in Table 1).27  
Hüpkes, Quintyn, and Taylor (2005) note that bank prudential supervisors are often 
given multiple goals, and indeed, the single goal given to US supervisors in PCA only applies 
to carrying out PCA’s provisions.28  However, most other goals of prudential supervision 
could be pursued in ways that do not significantly raise expected losses to the deposit 
insurer.  The one other goal that, according to some authors, might be in conflict is that of 
                                                                          
25. An almost equivalent way of viewing the problem is that of minimizing deposit insurance losses.  The differences 
between the two arise from the differential treatment of government expenditures outside the deposit insurance system.  
A U.S. example of this is the use of tax credit by NCNB to acquire First RepublicBank Corporation in Texas in 1988. 
Another way in which such assistance may be provided is via bailouts of bank borrowers to prevent a bank from failing 
due to loan losses. 
26. Stern, Gary H., and Ron J. Feldman (2004). Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington D.C. 
27. Mexico: Financial System Assessment Program, International Monetary Fund October, 2001 page 18 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr01192.pdf). 
28. Hupkes Eva, Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor (2005). The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: 
Principles and Practice, IMF Working Paper, March, No. 51. 
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limiting the damage to the real economy from bank failure.  PCA can result in the resolution of 
a bank that if given sufficient time might recover, thereby avoiding any failure related costs to 
the real economy. 
Benston and Kaufman (1995) argue that the failure of a bank in a system with 
multiple substitutes is no more costly than the failure of many other types of firms, such as the 
failure of firms that supply proprietary information technology that is widely used.29  This 
argument is perhaps partially qualified by several papers that have found evidence that the 
failure of a bank imposes costs on the bank’s borrowers.30  There are two hypotheses as to 
which types of bank borrowers are adversely impacted:  (1) the customers suffering the harm 
were good borrowers who were paying a market rate for their loans (the rate that a good 
bank would have charged if it had had a relationship with the borrower), and (2) the 
customers suffering harm were borrowers that were receiving credit at a below market rate 
(including bad customers that should not have received loans) because the failed bank was 
not demanding adequate compensation for the risk that it was taking.  The existing studies 
do not distinguish between these hypotheses, albeit structuring a test that could distinguish 
between the hypotheses is likely to be difficult and perhaps impossible. 
A longstanding concern is that the failure of a bank could lead to deposit runs at 
healthy banks, which would fall like dominoes, and lead to the collapse of the banking 
system.  A more recent concern is that the failure of some very large banks or a large number 
of banks on the payment system markets would have a substantial adverse impact on the 
operation of the real economy.  A narrow focus on limiting deposit insurance losses may not 
be appropriate if such a focused policy were to risk a systemic crisis. 
Although a case may be made that systemic concerns should override limiting the 
losses of the deposit insurer, that case has several weaknesses.  First, the analysis of 
systemic concerns typically takes the risk of bank failure as independent of bank supervisory 
policies.  However, bank supervisory policies that try to prevent bank failure by exercising 
forbearance towards failing banks and their creditors reduces the cost of risk-taking to a bank 
and its owners.  The resulting market prices for debt and equity are likely to create moral 
hazard by encouraging bank managers to take additional risk.  Moreover, PCA provides for 
early intervention to reduce the probability of failure in a variety of ways, including optional 
authority for the supervisors to remove ineffective bank officers and directors, and a 
mandatory requirement that the bank develops a capital restoration plan. 
Second, the argument that bank failures are likely to lead to systemic crisis is often 
overstated.  The historic case for deposit runs has been overstated, at least in the US, with 
the bulk of the runs occurring at insolvent banks according to Kaufman (1988).31  Moreover, 
concerns about runs at healthy banks may be mitigated by an active lender of last resort.32   
                                                                          
29. George J. Benston and George G. Kaufman (1995). "Is the Banking and Payments System Fragile?", Journal of 
Financial Services Research, December, v. 9, iss. 3-4, pp. 209-240.  
30. A recent paper finding evidence that bank failures reduced the value of their borrowers is Brewer, Elijah III, Hesna Genay, 
William Curt Hunter, and George G. Kaufman (2003). "The value of banking relationships during a financial crisis: Evidence 
from failures of Japanese banks", Journal of Japanese and International Economies, 17 (September) pp. 233-262.  
31. Kaufman, George G. (1988). Bank Runs: Causes, Benefits, and Costs, Cato Journal, Winter.  
32. Eisenbeis and Wall (2002, ref. 24 above) point out that the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 caused severe 
disruption to US financial system, including the inability of some financial to accept or route payments, but that a 
potential crisis was averted when the Federal Reserve stepped in to provide adequate liquidity. Eisenbeis and Wall 
(2002) also argue that the temporary disruptions resulting from a bank’s failure may be reduced by following appropriate 
resolution policies.  For example, resolution policies may be structured in a way that transfers the viable operations, 
insured deposits and other good liabilities to a healthy bank as soon as possible.  
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Third, allowing insolvent banks to continue in operation runs the risk that they will 
accumulate even larger losses leading to even greater market disruption when the bank’s 
continued operation is no longer tenable. In contrast, if a bank is required to be closed before 
its losses exceed the bank’s equity and subordinated debt then depositors and other 
creditors should not be exposed to any loss.  Moreover, prompt resolution reduces the 
probability that more than one systemically important bank will be insolvent at the same 
time.33  In sum, a supervisory focus on limiting deposit insurance costs is unlikely to result in 
significantly higher expected losses due to systemic financial problems and may well result 
in lower expected costs. 
In Europe, the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) proposal 
of SEIR to deal with problem banks implicitly recognizes the importance of supervisor's goal 
being to minimize deposit insurance losses.34 Nonetheless, although policy makers have not 
explicitly addressed the relative importance of minimizing deposit insurance losses, the 
relevant Directive on deposit insurance is fully compatible with such a focus.  Directive 
94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30th May, 1994 (Official Journal of 
the European Communities L 135, 31st May, 1994) on deposit guarantee schemes 
harmonizes minimum deposit insurance coverage, but also in its Preamble discourages 
governments from providing funding to their deposit insurer:35  “… the cost of financing such 
schemes must be borne, in principle, by credit institutions themselves ….”  At the same time, 
there are limitations, imposed by the EC Treaty, on the ECB and/or the Euro area national 
central banks´ lending to governments or institutions (article 101), which limit the possibility of 
central bank financing of deposit insurance schemes. There are also limitations on the EU 
Community’s ability to "bail out" governments and/or public entities (article 103).  Against this 
background, the case for minimizing the deposit insurers’ losses is even stronger in Europe, 
as recognized by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee's (ESFRC) in its 
proposal to deal with problem banks.36 
Nonetheless, governments´ continue to bail out depositors, and even shareholders, 
remain as shown in a recent survey on forms of intervention by European deposit insurance 
schemes, which shows that nineteen percent of interventions involved transfers of assets or 
other type of assistance in addition to depositors pay-off  in the period 1993 to 2003 (De 
Cesare, 2005).37  As a result, the moral hazard problem remains as shown in the cases of 
Banco di Napoli and Sicilcasa, which involved the use of public funds of approximately half a 
percent of Italy’s year-2000 GDP.38  
Although a compelling case may be made for restructuring deposit insurance in the 
EU, the potential weaknesses in the structure could be mitigated by a supervisory focus on 
                                                                          
33. The likelihood that more than one bank would become insolvent at the same time is small unless if the banks were 
exposed to and suffered losses due to a single shock, such as excessive exposure to interest rate changes. 
34. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 1, (June, 1998).  See ref. 4 above.  
35. Directive 94/19/EC was primarily designed with the aim of discouraging credit institutions within the EU from using 
protection's different features to compete with each other. To this end, it provides for a minimum harmonized level of 
protection of small depositors (€20,000 and transitionally below it in some countries that have recently joined the EU). 
See Garcia, G., and María J. Nieto (2005), "Banking Crisis Management in the European Union: Multiple Regulators and 
Resolution Authorities", Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 6 No. 3 pp. 215-219 for a description of the features of the 
EU countries’ deposit protection schemes. 
36. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 1, (June 1998). See ref. 4 above.  
37. The sample includes 32 European countries (24 EU members, 6 CEEC, Norway and Iceland). De Cesare, Manuela 
(2005), Report on Deposit Insurance: An international Outlook, Working Paper 8, Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei 
Depositi.  
38. Italy: Detailed Assessment of the Compliance of the Basle Core Principles of Banking Supervision, International 
Monetary Fund, May 2004  (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04133.pdf).  
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minimizing deposit insurance and ultimately taxpayers´ losses.  The weaknesses in the 
provision and funding of deposit insurance would become less important if banks were 
resolved before they could impose significant losses on the insurer.   
2.2 Should prudential supervisors’ discretion to exercise forbearance be reduced? 
A key component of any regulatory and supervisory arrangement is the nature, timing and 
form of intervention (Llewellyn 2002).39  Any supervisory system must determine what 
discretionary measures may be taken by the supervisors and who has authority to authorize 
those measures.  It must also determine (at least implicitly) whether supervisors should be 
required to intervene in a prespecified manner at a predetermined point.  PCA  accepts long-
standing US policy that gives the supervisors broad powers to intervene at their own 
discretion.  The key innovation of PCA is that it recommends a reduction of supervisory 
discretion to exercise forbearance by proposing a series of capital adequacy tranches with a 
set of mandatory supervisory actions for each of the undercapitalized tranches.  Mandatory 
supervisory actions are intended to override the incentives supervisors would otherwise have 
to engage in forbearance. 
In the US, the greatest opposition to PCA came from bank supervisors, who 
perceived it as a reduction in their power, visibility and freedom to control banks (Horvitz, 
1995).40  This opposition could not prevent the passage of PCA, however, in large part 
because the supervisors´ credibility had been weakened greatly by the large thrift crisis and 
was further weakened by the perception that additional costly failures were also likely in the 
banking industry. 
One argument against mandating supervisory actions in certain circumstances as is 
done in PCA is that retaining supervisory discretion to exercise forbearance increases the 
probability that a distressed bank will be able to recover without being forced into resolution.  
This lack of discretion is particularly criticized with respect to mandatory reorganization which 
eliminates any prospect that banks with very low capital will recover.  The problem with this 
analysis, as noted above, is that implicitly assumes that PCA will have no affect on the 
probability that a bank will become financially distressed. 
The general concept that supervisors should intervene promptly is reflected in three 
of the four principles in Pillar II of the new Capital Accord. Principle 2 of Pillar II calls for 
supervisory evaluation of bank’s internal procedures for maintaining adequate capital and take 
appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied.  Principle 3 states that supervisors 
should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have 
the ability to require banks to operate above the minimum.  Principle 4 establishes that 
supervisors should intervene at an early stage to prevent individual bank’s capital from falling 
below the minimum requirements and require rapid remedial action. These principles were 
largely enacted in the PCA provisions of FDICIA in the US, although PCA goes well beyond 
them because it establishes leverage ratios that require minimum supervisory action.  
Moreover, Pillar II contains neither mandatory nor discretionary provisions to replenish capital 
and turn trouble institutions around before insolvency.  Also, it does not contain a closure rule.  
                                                                          
39. Llewelyn, D. T. (2002). "Comment", in Prompt Corrective Action: Ten Years Late, G. G. Kaufman, ed., Amsterdam, 
JAI, pp. 321-333 [also published in Mayes, D., and D. T. Llewellyn (2003). The role of market discipline in handling 
problem banks,  Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 21].  See also Carnell, Richard S. (1993). "The Culture of Ad Hoc 
Discretion", in G. Kaufman and R. Litan (eds.), Assessing Bank Reform: FDICIA One Year Later, Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, pp. 113-121.  
40. Horvitz, P. M. (1995). "Banking regulation as a solution to financial fragility", Journal of Financial Services Research, 
December, pp. 369-380.  
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The new Capital Accord has been adopted by the EU and that would require the   
transposition to national regulations/legislations of the Recasting of Directive 2000/12/EC of 
the EU Parliament and the Council of March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions and Council Directive 93/6/EC of 15 March 1993 on the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions; referred to as “Capital Requirements 
Directive" (CRD).41  Principles 3 and 4 of Basle's Pillar II are broadly dealt with in article 124 of 
the CRD.42  This article is developed in the so called Supervisory Review Process (SRP).43  
SRP requires a review and evaluation of the banks´ risk profile and management system and 
calls for prudential measures to be applied promptly.44  Those prudential measures include 
setting a capital requirement above the Pillar 1 (own funds or Tier 1) although the Guidelines 
emphasize that they "should not be interpreted as resulting in automatic capital add-ons".  
Other measures contemplated in the Guidelines are:  Requiring an improvement of the 
institution internal and risk management controls; applying specific provisioning policy or 
treatment of risk assets in terms of regulatory capital requirements; restricting the business 
operations and/or reducing the risk profile of its activities. The specific own funds requirement 
is envisaged only if the above mentioned imbalances cannot be remedied by other prudential 
measures within an appropriate time frame.  These remedial actions establish the principle of 
early intervention, but do not significantly reduce supervisory discretion as to when to 
intervene or establish minimum supervisory actions.   
The SRP as well as the Article 124 of the CRD constitute a step in the right direction 
to reduce forbearance and bring about timely corrective action by supervisors when banks 
fail to meet prudential requirements.  Nonetheless, in line with the new Capital Accord, they 
fall short of a structured early intervention mechanism in the EU as envisaged by the 
European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC). The present proposal may 
succeed in reducing the moral hazard behavior by banks, which should expect supervisory 
reaction to their excess risk taking.  However, a more structured prudential performance 
benchmark would make the imposition of sanctions more credible, further discouraging poor 
agent behavior of prudential supervisors.  In this context, market discipline should play even a 
more important role in putting a backstop to prudential supervisory action in the EU. 
2.3 Should banks be closed with positive regulatory capital?  
Both SEIR and PCA call for timely resolution, which is a policy where banks with sufficiently 
low, but still positive, equity capital are forced into resolution.  In the US context, resolution is 
understood to include:  (1) the government assuming control of the failed bank, firing the 
senior managers and removing equity holders from any governance role, and (2) the 
                                                                          
41. The CRD covers Pillar II in Articles 123, 124 and Annex XI as well as Article 22 and Annex V, which deal with internal 
governance. Directives are binding as regards the results to be achieved and the forms and methods, in general national 
legislation, for its achievement are left to member States.  
42. Article 124 of the CRD: "1- [T]he competent authorities shall review the arrangements, strategies, processes and 
mechanisms implemented by credit institutions to comply with this Directive and evaluate the risks to which the credit 
institutions are or might be exposed. 
3- On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall determine 
whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the credit institutions and the own 
funds held ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks."  
43. SRP represents the collective views of EU supervisors on the standards that credit institutions are expected to 
observe and the supervisory practices that supervisory authorities will apply (http://www.c-ebs.org/pdfs/GL03.pdf, see 
page 37). 
44. See http://www.c-ebs.org/Consultation_papers/CP03-second.pdf 
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government returning the bank’s assets to private control through some combination of sale 
to a healthy bank or banks, new equity issue, or liquidation.45  
Timely resolution provides two important benefits.  First, forcing a bank into 
resolution while it still has positive regulatory capital truncates if not eliminates the value of the 
deposit insurance put option, reducing the incentive of the bank’s shareholders to support 
excess risk taking.  Second, timely resolution is critical to limiting deposit insurance losses. If 
insolvent banks are allowed to continue in operation then the potential losses from failure can 
be very large. 
Timely resolution in the US was perceived by some authors as the government 
taking private property (Horvitz, 1995).46  The key argument against the claim that timely 
resolution involves taking shareholders’ property is that PCA provides the shareholders with 
an opportunity to recapitalize the bank before the bank is forced into resolution.  If the 
shareholders are unwilling to recapitalize the bank and unable to sell it to a healthy bank, that 
suggests that the owners and other banks agree the bank is no longer financially viable.  The 
timely resolution provision of PCA has been employed by the FDIC and has not been found to 
be contrary to the US constitution. 
In Europe, as highlighted by Mayes, Halme and Liuksila (2001), with only limited 
exceptions and contrary to the case in the US, supervisors have often limited legal powers to 
intervene if a bank becomes critically undercapitalized or its net worth turns negative.47  In 
these authors´ opinion, which is shared by Hadjiemmanuil (2004) as well as the authors of this 
article, what is often missing is a delegation of legislative authority to the prudential supervisor 
as parliament's designated agent to reorganize and liquidate banks.48 
                                                                          
45. Bank liquidation is generally as a last resort in the US because it imposes greater costs on the bank’s customers and 
destroys any franchise value created by the failed bank.  The FDIC acting as receiver will only liquidate a bank if doing so 
reduces the expected cost of resolution to the deposit insurance fund. 
46. See Horvitz, P. M. (1995) ref. 40 above. 
47. Mayes, D. G., L. Halme and A. Liuksila (2001.) Improving Banking Supervision, Basingstoke, Palgrave. 
48. Hadjiemmanuil, Ch. (2004). Europe´s Universalist Approach to Cross-Border Bank Resolution Issues, presented at 
the Conference on Systemic Financial Crisis:  Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies, sponsored by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago. 
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3 Institutional preconditions for a successful PCA 
The primary effect of PCA was not to give US supervisors new powers but rather to limit their 
ability to forbear in using the powers that they largely already had been given.  The Member 
States of the EU have developed a variety of bank supervisory systems reflecting their 
individual political systems; the needs of their banking system; and their legal traditions.  In 
order to effectively implement PCA, many of the bank supervisory systems will need to 
provide their supervisors with additional authorities and resources.  This section considers a 
number of important prerequisites for PCA to be an effective policy.  Our goals are two-fold, 
first to explain why the authority or resource is necessary and second to show that those 
preconditions are, in most instances, already called for by the Core Principles of Banking 
Supervision issued by the Basel Committee, although none of the Core Principles for Effective 
Bank Supervision prescribe PCA. 
3.1 Supervisory independence and accountability 
PCA retained US bank supervisors’ authority to intervene in a variety of ways if the bank was 
violating a specific statute or regulation, or if the supervisors concluded it was being operated 
in an unsafe or unsound manner.  The US supervisors did not need political or judicial 
approval prior to PCA to intervene at a troubled bank or to force an insolvent bank into 
resolution.49  The major change in supervisory practice resulting from PCA is that after PCA 
the supervisors were required to intervene as a bank’s supervisory capital ratios deteriorated.   
The independence of supervisory action provided to supervisors before PCA is 
critical to the effective operation of PCA.50  A system that requires the prior approval of 
political authorities creates the potential for delay and forbearance in supervisory intervention 
to the extent that the political authorities do not follow the supervisors´ recommendations.  
Moreover, if this condition is not met, the requirement of prior political approval reduces the 
effectiveness of PCA in discouraging banks from taking excessive risk. 
Similarly, requiring prior judicial approval would limit the effectiveness of PCA.  A 
court could be asked to certify that a bank is undercapitalized and remedial action is 
appropriate, but the determination of whether a bank is undercapitalized is likely either:  (1) 
trivial in that the court merely uses available data to verify the supervisors arithmetic, or (2) 
calls for the court to undertake actions outside its qualifications, such as determining the 
correct value of the bank’s capital or evaluating whether the supervisor has chosen the 
appropriate discretionary actions to help the bank recover. 
The requirement for supervisory independence does not imply that supervisors 
should be free to operate outside the political and legal system in a representative 
democracy.  SEIR does not challenge the principal that the supervisory agencies should be 
accountable for their actions and, as discussed above, PCA sought to strengthen that 
accountability.  The key is that the supervisors should be accountable after supervisory 
                                                                          
49. FDICIA does add a new requirement for approval of a political authority, the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation 
with the President. However, that requirement applies only if the FDIC wants to resolve a bank in a way that protects 
otherwise uninsured creditors of the bank at the expense of the insurance fund (often called the “systemic risk” 
exception). The FDIC is not required to obtain political approval for resolutions that are in accord with the least cost 
resolution provision of FDICIA.  
50. In theory, a requirement for political or judicial approval might not be a problem for effective PCA provided the 
approval was promptly and automatically given. However, there would also be no benefit to such a requirement. 
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intervention to the judicial system for the legality of their actions and to the political authorities 
for the appropriateness of their actions. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognized the importance of 
supervisory independence by making independence part of its first “Core Principle for 
Effective Bank Supervision:”51 
 Basel Core Principle 1: "An effective system of banking supervision will have clear 
responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks. 
Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate 
resources …" 
 
European countries broadly comply with this principle since the political 
independence of the banking supervisors is generally adequate in spite of the fact that, in 
some countries, the presence of the government representatives on their supervisory boards 
could potentially raise the issue of independence from the government. Moreover, in 
Germany, although the supervisory authority is independent in its operations, BaFin is subject 
to the legal and supervisory control of the Minister of Finance.52   In Switzerland, there 
appears to be a lack of administrative independence with regard to the supervisory authority 
´s budget, which is incorporated into the Finance Ministry's Budget. 
The extent to which the supervisors are able to act independent of the judiciary 
varies by country. In some countries, such as France, the prudential supervisor is an 
administrative judiciary authority when imposing sanctions and its decisions and sanctions 
can only be challenged before the highest administrative judicial authority.  However, in other 
countries, such as Austria, the legal system puts in some cases the burden of the proof on 
the supervisors before they can take remedial action, which is likely to delay prompt 
corrective action. The legal protection of supervisors for their actions taken in good faith in 
their office varies from country to country.  In Italy, the law does not provide such legal 
protection to its supervisors against court proceedings.   See Table 1 for a description of 
objectives, autonomy and remedial measures of prudential supervisors in the EU and selected 
countries outside the EU. 
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) recognized the 
importance of complying with the requirement that supervisors have operational 
independence.  The Committee argued that for SEIR to be credible the political independence 
of the supervisory agencies should be strengthened.53  
3.2 Adequate authority 
PCA requires that the prudential supervisors be given authority to intervene in 
undercapitalized banks, both as a deterrent to risk taking by healthy banks and to try to 
rebuild capital at undercapitalized banks.  If a bank’s capital drops below minimal acceptable 
levels, PCA requires that the bank be placed in resolution. 
                                                                          
51. The Core Principles were issued by the Basle Committee in September 1997, and endorsed by the international financial 
community during the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Hong Kong in October, 1997 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30.pdf). Observance of the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. IMF-WB 
Assessments are available in the web site (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/search.aspx?filter_val=N&NewQuery 
=basle+core+principles+banking+supervision&col=SITENG&collection=&lan=eng). The present institutional arrangements 
may have changed since the date of the assessment. 
52. See Germany Financial Stability Assessment, November 2003 (p. 52), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/ 
cr03343.pdf  
53. European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee Statement No. 1, ref. 4 above.  
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The need for adequate authority is also recognized by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision:  
 Basle Core Principle 22: "Banking supervisors must have at their disposal adequate 
supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action when banks fail to meet 
prudential requirements (such as minimum capital adequacy ratios), when there are 
regulatory violations, or where depositors are threatened in any other way.  In extreme 
circumstances, this would include the ability to revoke the banking license or 
recommend its revocation" 
 
The PCA policy applied in the US goes beyond Basel Core Principle 22 only in that 
supervisors have direct authority to revoke the license, whereas the Core Principle allows for 
the possibility that the supervisor may only be able to recommend revocation.  This difference 
is crucial to the extent that political authorities may not follow supervisors´ recommendations. 
As shown in Table 1, European countries´ degree of compliance with this Principle 
varies country to country.54  In a number of countries, the banking law provides supervisors 
with a wide range of possible corrective actions depending on the severity of the situation. 
Moreover, if the prudential supervisor does not take immediate action, firms and/or individuals 
may raise this in a proceeding against them under the general jurisdiction of the courts and 
Tribunal.  In some other countries, such as Finland, Sweden and Iceland, prudential 
supervisory powers do not contemplate provisions for approval of new acquisitions, the ability 
to restrict asset transfer or to suspend payments to shareholder and/or to purchase banks 
own shares.  In still other countries, such as Italy, Austria, and Sweden, legislators do not 
provide prudential supervisors with authority to bar appointment of individuals from banking 
once the person has been hired and passed the initial fit and proper test.  Although, the 
decision to revoke a bank license corresponds to the supervisory authority, in a number of 
countries the government must formally approve the license withdrawal or adoption of 
specific crisis procedures.  Last but not least, in some of the recent entrants in the EU, the 
ability of the supervisor to address safety and soundness issues in banks is significantly 
encumbered by its institutional capacity and resources. 
3.3 Adequate resolution procedures  
Confidence in the resolution procedure is critical if bank prudential supervisors are to enforce 
the timely resolution embedded in PCA.  Bank supervisors are likely to resist forcing a bank 
into resolution if they know it will result in major disruption, such as when the deposit insurer 
lacked adequate funds to honor its commitments or the resolution procedures were likely to 
result in severe market disruption.  Supervisors would resist both because of concerns about 
the costs that the closure would impose on society and on the likely parliamentary response 
to a bank closure that severely disrupted the economy.  One example of the resistance to 
timely action is that of the US thrift industry, where even after the supervisors accepted the 
need to resolve many failed thrifts, they did not do so because they lacked adequate 
resources to honor the deposit insurance commitments.   
In the US, the bank insolvency procedure is administered by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. FDICIA built upon previously developed US procedures for handling 
failing banks with a goal of providing supervisors with sufficient tools to allow timely closure of 
banks at minimal cost to the deposit insurance fund.  If a private sector resolution cannot be 
                                                                          
54. Observance of the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. IMF-WB Assessments. See ref. 51 
above.  
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worked out without government intervention, the FDIC has several options under US law 
including:  (1) act as a conservator and operate the bank under its existing charter, or (2) ask 
the chartering authority to revoke the charter and appoint the FDIC as receiver.55  In practice 
the FDIC’s intervention has taken the form of receivership. As receiver the FDIC can limit 
creditors’ ability to withdraw funds and can allocate losses in excess of equity to the 
uninsured creditors. 
Once the FDIC is appointed receiver of a failed bank, the agency has three options.  
First, the FDIC may provide assistance to a healthy bank that purchases most or all of the 
failed bank’s assets and assumes the failed bank’s insured deposits and some uninsured 
liabilities.  Second, the FDIC may decide to liquidate the bank.  Third, it may create a new 
bank which it temporarily manages pending the sale of part or the entire bank to a healthy 
bank and liquidates whatever is not sold.  Regardless of which option the FDIC chooses, the 
agency typically provides insured depositors with immediate access to their funds and 
uninsured depositors at domestic offices with access to at least part of their funds.56  The 
FDIC’s ability to act expeditiously in resolving a failed bank outside the bankruptcy courts 
reduces the period of uncertainty for the bank’s creditors, borrowers and other customers 
and may help to reduce the impact of the failure on the financial system. 
In Europe, although there is considerable variation across countries, European 
prudential supervisors have, in principle, a more limited set of options in dealing with a 
distressed bank, which, generally, are defined by the banking and/or bankruptcy laws.  
Hüpkes (2003) discusses two alternatives for resolving bank problems in Europe, neither of 
which are in some aspects as flexible as those available in the US, primarily because of the 
limited range of supervisory measures to bring about early resolution without applying to the 
courts and the rigidities imposed by the general insolvency procedures applied to banks.57 
As described in section 3.2, bank supervisors are empowered to different degrees to 
employ a range of measures, some of which can be very intrusive, in order to take remedial 
action.  In contrast to the US, some European prudential supervisors (Germany, Italy and 
Switzerland), have the power to impose a moratorium against debt enforcement prior to the 
bank being declared insolvent and placed into bankruptcy.  However, not all supervisors have 
this power and in countries, such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Luxembourg, 
bank supervisors have to apply to the courts.  Such measures are typically accompanied with 
some form of direct or indirect control via by a provisional administrator on bank's 
management.  Hüpkes (2003) describes the suspension and appointment of a provisional 
administrator as a “quasi-insolvency” procedure, which gives the provisional administrator 
wide ranging powers to bring about a resolution, including the sale of new stock and the 
transfer of ownership.   
If a bank cannot be made viable under a payments suspension and the appointment 
of provisional administrator, the alternative is liquidation.  Hüpkes (2003) notes that the 
administration of bank insolvency proceedings is regarded as a judicial function in most 
European jurisdictions.  In some countries such as the United Kingdom, the courts rely 
                                                                          
55. However, these special provisions in the US apply only to chartered banks.  The nonbank corporate parent and 
nonbank affiliates of a US bank are subject to the corporate bankruptcy provisions of US law.  
56. Kaufman, George G., and Steven A. Selig (2000). Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors at Failed Banks:  
Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk and Too-Big-To Fail, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
working paper WP 2000-16.  
57. Hüpkes, E. (2003). "Insolvency - why a special regime for banks?", in Current Developments in Monetary and 
Financial Law, Vol. 3, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.  
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entirely on general corporate bankruptcy procedures; whereas in other countries, such as 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Portugal, special rules or 
exemptions to the general bankruptcy law are established in the banking law.  These 
approaches are consistent with a "marked trend toward providing the supervisor with wider 
powers and to either complement or replace powers previously exercised by judicial 
authorities" (Hüpkes, 2003, p. 8).  Some countries, such as France, allow for the coexistence 
of administrative proceedings controlled by the prudential supervisors and court judicial 
proceedings.  The court allows the bank to continue operating, while trying to rehabilitate it, or 
to simply liquidate. Hüpkes (2003, p. 23) notes that a bank reaching this point is likely to be 
liquidated as “all corrective measures available under the banking law as well as mediation 
attempts will have already been exhausted.”  
Hüpkes (2003) analysis suggests that the existing legal framework offers European 
prudential supervisors two suboptimal options for addressing an insolvent bank:  (1) limited 
provisional administration, which may not be sufficient to bring about efficient resolution, or (2) 
turning the problem over to a bankruptcy court, which in some jurisdictions is an administered 
bankruptcy proceeding under the banking law.  These options are unlikely to fully benefit from 
the supervisors’ understanding of the banking system and, in some instances, risk conflict 
between judicial and supervisory authorities arising from disparate assessments and 
recommendations. 
Not only are failed banks typically resolved through regular corporate bankruptcy 
proceedings, but the Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes does not require that 
depositors will have immediate access to their funds.  Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
are the only European countries whose legislators have set more ambitious timing for the 
receipt of compensation (Garcia and Nieto, 2005).58 The potential delay in providing 
depositors with access to their funds may have macroeconomic consequences that would 
encourage authorities with responsibility for macroeconomic conditions to strongly encourage 
supervisory forbearance.  Dermine (1996, p. 680) stated that: 
The issue is not so much the fear of a domino effect where the failure of a large bank 
would create the failure of many smaller ones; strict analysis of counterparty 
exposures has reduced substantially the risk of a domino effect. The fear is rather that 
the need to close a bank for several months to value its illiquid assets would freeze a 
large part of deposit and savings, causing a significant negative effect on national 
consumption.59 
 
Although resolution policy has largely been left to its Member States, the EU has 
addressed some of the potential problems with reorganizing and winding up credit institutions 
that operate across member boundaries.  The Reorganization and Winding up Directive for 
EU Credit Institutions (Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 April)60, which only applies to cross-border banking crisis, has harmonized the rules of 
private international law applicable to bank collective proceedings with the aim of ensuring the 
mutual recognition by Member States of the national measures relating to the reorganization 
and administrative or court-based liquidation of EU banks which have branches in other 
                                                                          
58. See Table 4 in Garcia, G. H., and M. J. Nieto (2005),  ref. 35 above.  The potential for delay in providing depositors 
with access to their funds could be even greater in the case of "ex post" funded deposit insurance funds. 
59. Dermine, Jean (1996). "Comment", Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, (December), pp. 679-682.  
60. Official Journal of the European Communities L125, 5th May, 2001. At the time of writing this article, implementation 
was pending in four Member States:  Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal and Sweden. 
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Member States.61  Hence, the Directive has not harmonized the national banking and 
bankruptcy laws on those aspects dealing with banks´ reorganization and liquidation 
procedures.62  The Directive recognizes intervention into third party rights by administrative or 
judicial authorities as valid reorganization measures.  In fact, it defines "reorganization 
measures" (Title II) as measures which are intended to preserve or restore the financial 
situation of a credit institution and which could affect third parties´ pre-existing rights, 
including measures involving the possibility of a suspension of payments, suspension of 
enforcement measures or reduction of claims. 
The Directive’s provision recognizing the powers of administrative and judicial 
procedures to intervene in third party rights may have important implications for quasi-judicial 
procedures. Hüpkes (2003) points out that the European Court of Justice may have limited 
the ability of quasi-insolvency procedures to bring about effective resolution in EU Member 
States as a result of its 1996 opinion in Panagis Pafitis and other v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados 
AE and others (“Pafitis case”).63  This view is shared by Mayes, Halme and Liuksila (2001) who 
argue that the Pafitis case made intervention at positive benchmarks impossible in Europe.64 
However, the wording in the 2001 Directive appears to endorse quasi-insolvency proceedings 
raises the possibility that the Court might now reach a different conclusion were it to be 
presented with a similar case.  
Although the Directive will provide some minimum basis for resolution after a bank is 
declared insolvent, it does little to create a common framework for determining when a bank 
will be forced into resolution.  In particular, the Directive fell short of creating a framework 
of commonly accepted standards of bank resolution practice, including a common definition 
of bank insolvency and a fully-fledged single legal framework or common decision-making 
structures across Member States, which adds complexity to the notification among Member 
States´ authorities.  
3.4 Accurate and timely financial information 
Arguably, the biggest weakness of PCA is its reliance on regulatory capital measures of a 
bank’s capital, measures which may significantly deviate from the bank’s economic capital. 
Banks that are threatened by PCA mandated supervisory actions have a strong incentive to 
report inflated estimates of the value of their portfolios.  The extent to which banks are 
allowed to overestimate their capital under PCA depends in part on the accounting rules and 
in part on the enforcement of the rules.  Thus, if bank prudential supervisors want to preserve 
their discretion despite the requirements for mandatory actions in PCA, supervisors need only 
accept a troubled bank’s inflated estimates of its regulatory capital adequacy ratio.   
In the US, PCA is vulnerable to problems both in the accounting principles and their 
enforcement. The weakness in the principles is that US generally accepted accounting 
principles (US GAAP) generally do not permit the revaluation of assets and liabilities for 
changes in market interest rates, the exception being securities held in a trading account or 
available for sale if they are traded on a recognized exchange.  This problem was well 
                                                                          
61.  Financial institutions are excluded from the EU Insolvency Proceedings Regulation (Council Regulation EC N0 
1346/2000 of 29 May, 2000 on insolvency proceedings) and the Winding-up Directive parallels in the banking field that 
regulation governing general corporate insolvency law. The Winding-up Directive does not apply to the insurance, 
securities and UCITS activities of the conglomerate. 
62. This development has been possible because of the pre-existence of a heavily harmonized system of banking 
regulation and supervision in the EU.  EU Policy makers have traditionally relied on regulatory harmonization to achieve 
the integration of financial markets.  See Garcia and Nieto ( 2005), pp. 209-210, ref. 35  above.  
63. Panagis Pafitis and other v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE and others (Case C-441/93), CMLR, 9 July 1996.  
64. Mayes, D. G., L. Halme and A. Liuksila (2001). Improving Banking  Supervision, Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
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understood at the time of the adoption of PCA, which encourages but does not require the 
supervisors to adopt market value accounting.  However, the supervisors have chosen not to 
take up this part of PCA, or even to use the fair value balance sheets that are available in 
publicly traded banks.  
The first line of defense in the US for enforcing compliance with accounting rules, 
especially loan loss provisioning rules, are the external auditors of a bank.65  The total impact 
of external auditors is hard to judge, as there is rarely any public disclosure when a bank 
changes its asset valuation in response to its external auditor’s comments.  
Dahl, O’Keefe and Hanweck (1998) find evidence that external auditors on average 
exerted an influence over bank loan loss provisioning during the 1987 to 1997 period.66  
However, that study is not designed to indicate whether external auditors were effective in 
forcing loss recognition that would result in a bank becoming undercapitalized.  There are 
cases prior to PCA which raised questions about the effectiveness of external auditors, such 
as their real estate loan valuations at many banks in the northeast in the early 1990s that 
differed substantially from supervisory valuations.67  In the post PCA period, reviews of bank 
failures that caused material losses to the FDIC by the offices of inspector general of the 
respective agencies have found several cases where external auditors did not adequately 
verify the correctness of asset valuations.68  The official policies of the supervisory agencies 
call upon them to review the work of the external auditor, primarily to streamline the work of 
the bank examiners but also to assess the adequacy of the audit.69  To the extent that outside 
auditors are unable or unwilling to force banks to recognize losses in their asset portfolios, 
PCA depends on the effectiveness of bank examinations by the supervisory agencies.  Yet 
relying on the supervisors to enforce honest accounting creates a contradiction in PCA.  PCA 
is designed to limit supervisory discretion in enforcing capital adequacy, yet PCA will only be 
fully effective if the bank supervisors use their discretion in conducting on-site examinations to 
force timely recognition of declines in portfolio value. 
The vulnerability in enforcement is highlighted by Eisenbeis and Wall’s (2002) finding 
that deposit insurance losses at failed banks in the US did not decrease as a proportion of the 
failed bank’s assets after the adoption of PCA as should have happened if the supervisors 
were following timely resolution.70 Their findings suggest that bank supervisors do not always 
                                                                          
65. Bank regulations do not require audited financial statements of banks with less than $500 million in assets and some 
smaller banks are not audited. 
66. Dahl, Drew, John P. O'Keefe, and Gerald A. Hanweck (1998). "The Influence of Auditors and Examiners on 
Accounting Discretion in the Banking Industry", FDIC Banking Review, (Winter), V. 11, pp. 10-25.  However, another 
study looking specifically at banks that restated their financial condition suggests that examiners have an impact after 
taking account of external auditors (albeit the paper only includes a binary audit variable in its model and does not focus 
specifically on restatements by banks that have been audited).  See Gunther and Moore (2003), "Loss underreporting 
and the auditing role of bank exams", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12 (April) pp. 153-177.  
67. An example of the differences in valuations between those of the bank supervisors and the values in the financial 
statements (which were approved by the bank’s auditors) is given by the United States General Accounting Office 
(1991), Bank Supervision: OCC's Oversight of the Bank of New England Was Not Timely or Forceful (GAO/GGD-91-128, 
Sept. 16) <http://archive.gao.gov/d19t9/144822.pdf>.  
68. Examples of cases where the relevant inspector general criticized the external auditors’ performance or the 
supervisor’s reliance on the outside auditor to catch valuation errors or both include:  (a) Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Office of Inspector General (2003), Material Loss Review of the Failure of the Connecticut Bank of 
Commerce, Stamford, Connecticut (Audit Report No. 03-017) <http://www.fdicig.gov/reports03/03-017.pdf>, (b) United 
States Treasury Office of the Inspector General (2002) Material Loss Review of Superior Bank, FSB, (OIG-02-040), 
<http://www.treas.gov/inspector-general/audit-reports/2002/oig02040.pdf>, and (c) United States Treasury Office of the 
Inspector General (2000) Material Loss Review of The First National Bank of Keystone, OIG-00-067 
<http://www.treas.gov/inspector-general/audit-reports/2000/oig00067.pdf>.  
69. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (2003), Internal and External Audits: Comptrollers Handbook (April) 
<http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/resources/audit/occ-hb-internal_external_audits-intro.pdf>. 
70. Eisenbeis, Robert A., and Larry D. Wall’s (2002). See ref. 24 above.  
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enforce timely recognition of losses.  Moreover, these weaknesses in PCA are not limited to 
the US.  Japan adopted a version of PCA in 1998, but did not impose sanctions on banks 
widely thought to be undercapitalized or even insolvent because the banks reported adequate 
regulatory capital ratios.71  
The EU is addressing the problems in obtaining accurate and timely information.  
Although in the EU, Member States have traditionally had different supervisory requirements 
and accounting rules, harmonization has taken place in the recent years to comply with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).72  Most importantly, IFRS requires fair 
value accounting which takes account of changes in portfolio value due to interest rate 
changes. In addition, EU bank prudential supervisors aim at streamlining financial reporting 
under IFRS, focusing on harmonization of reporting formats and convergence of supervisory 
reporting requirements. In the first stage, efforts have been oriented towards the primary 
reporting formats, such as balance sheet and profit and loss accounts.  Moreover, EU bank 
supervisors have also developed a common reporting framework for the implementation of 
the new solvency ratio under Basle II.  
With very few exceptions, EU banks are required to present audited financial 
statements.  Most, but not all, EU supervisors also supplement bank auditing with on-site 
examinations to verify banks’ reported financial condition.73  The on-site inspections provide 
supervisors with the opportunity to enforce timely loan loss recognition, but it is only an 
opportunity.  Losses may not be recognized in a timely manner if the supervisors fail to use 
their discretion to enforce timely recognition.   
One way of reducing the vulnerability of PCA to over-estimates of capital is to 
supplement regulatory capital ratios with market data in setting the tripwires between different 
PCA categories.  Such market signals could be derived from the debt or equity markets for 
banks that have (or could issue) actively traded debt or equity obligations. For example, 
Evanoff and Wall (2002) propose using the spread between the yield on subordinated debt 
and other debt securities of comparable maturity as a trigger for PCA sanctions at the largest 
US banks.74  Evanoff and Wall’s (2002) analysis found that subordinated debt yield spreads 
produced more accurate predictions of upcoming confidential supervisory ratings than did 
bank’s risk-based regulatory capital ratios.75  However, because they also found that both risk 
measures contain substantial noise, they suggest limiting the use of subordinated debt only 
as a failsafe mechanism to identify critically undercapitalized banks.76 
In the EU, in spite of the fact that there is a lack of statistical reliable data; according 
to the BIS (2003), retail investors seem to play a larger role given the relatively high number of 
small banks that issue subordinated debt.  To the extent that institutional investors are better 
                                                                          
71. Japan: Financial Sector Stability Assessment and supplementary information. International Monetary Fund 
September 2003 (< http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03287.pdf >). 
72. Directive 2003/51/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June, 2003 (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 178/16). 
73. One exception which has been identified by the IMF Financial System Stability Assessment is Germany. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03343.pdf. 
74. Douglas D. Evanoff, and Larry D. Wall (2002). "Subordinated Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action", 
Prompt Corrective Action in Banking: 10 Years Later, edited by George Kaufman, pp. 53-119. This book is volume 14 of 
Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy, published by JAI. 
75. Douglas D. Evanoff, and Larry D. Wall (2002). "Sub-Debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures", Journal of Banking 
and Finance, (May) pp. 989-1009. 
76. However, Evanoff and Wall (2002, see ref. 74 above) also note that the quality of the signal obtained from 
subordinated debt may be improved if large banks were required to issue subordinated debt on an annual or semi-
annual basis. 
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placed to exercise market discipline, this may pose a limitation to market discipline of EU 
banks. Furthermore, Benink and Benston (2005) show that the level of subordinated debt 
over total assets of EU commercial banks increased little over the period 1999-2003.77    
Nonetheless, EU banks and in particular German, British and Spanish banks are large issuers 
of subordinated bonds. Moreover, the concentration of debt issues per most issuing bank is 
relatively low in the EU as compared to the USA or Japan.78 
Sironi (2001) empirically tested the risk sensitivity of subordinated debt spreads of 
over 400 fixed rate subordinated bonds of EU banks, using publicly available information such 
as ratings and market variables. Sironi found that investors appear to rationally discriminate 
between the different risk profiles of European banks and that the sensitivity of the 
subordinated debt spreads has been increasing overtime "suggesting that implicit guarantees 
such as TBTF policies were present in the first half of the nineties and became weaker or 
vanished during the second part of the decade."79  However, Sironi as well as most other 
empirical studies of risk sensitivity of subordinated debt lacked access to confidential 
supervisory ratings and, thus, was forced to implicitly assume that publicly available 
information reflects a bank’s risk profile in a timely and adequate manner.  
                                                                          
77. Benink, H., and George J. Benston (2005). See ref. 6 above.  
78. Bank for Internacional Settlements, (2003). Markets for Subordinated Debt and Equity in Basle Committee Member 
Countries, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 12. Benink, H., and George J. Benston (2005), 
see ref. 6 above.  
79. Sironi, A. (2001). Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry:  Evidence from Subordinated Debt.   
The Financial Safety Net: Costs, Benefits, and Implications for Regulation. The 37th Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition,  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 366-384.  
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4 Conclusions 
Prompt corrective supervisory action seeks to minimize expected losses to the deposit 
insurer and taxpayer by limiting supervisors’ ability to engage in forbearance.  Along with 
reducing taxpayer losses, PCA should also reduce banks’ incentive to engage in moral 
hazard behavior by reducing or eliminating the subsidy to risk-taking provided by mispriced 
deposit insurance. These potential benefits from PCA appear to have been recognized, as 
reflected in the increasing number of recommendations to policy makers to introduce PCA 
type of provisions in their national legislation.  Japan, Korea and, more recently Mexico have 
adopted this prudential policy.  However, an effective PCA policy requires on one hand the 
acceptance of key aspects of the philosophy underlying SEIR/PCA, on the other, an 
institutional framework supportive of supervisors’ disciplinary action.  This article attempts to 
identify the changes needed to adopt an effective PCA in general and, in particular, in Europe. 
Three aspects of the philosophy underlying SEIR/PCA are critical to its effective 
operation.  First, the primary goal of prudential supervisors should be to minimize deposit 
insurance losses, a goal which is also likely to result in a reduction in the expected social 
costs of systemic financial problems.  The 94/19/EC Directive on deposit insurance schemes, 
as well as the EC Treaty (articles 101 and 103) discourage governments and limit central 
banks from providing funding to the deposit insurance.    Hence, this regulation is in line with 
this element of the SEIR/PCA philosophy.   A second critical part of their philosophy is that 
prudential supervisory discretion to engage in forbearance should be limited.  PCA requires 
mandatory intervention at an early stage of a bank’s financial problems.  Such intervention 
may prevent insolvency by (a) contributing to an early recognition by banks’ managers of the 
banks’ problems; (b) putting pressure on banks’ managers to build capital and avoid 
excessive risk taking.  Pillar II of the proposed new capital accord contains three principles 
that require prompt supervisory intervention.  These principles are broadly dealt with in the 
recently approved CRD.  However, the resemblance to the PCA should not be overstated. 
The PCA policy applied in the US goes beyond those three principles of Basle II in that it limits 
even further supervisory discretion as to when to forbear from intervening by specifying 
capital/asset ratios that require minimum and automatic supervisory action.  The third critical 
part of PCA follows from the first two parts, banks should be subject to mandatory closure at 
positive levels of regulatory capital ratio.  This provides an incentive to banks’ managers to 
recapitalize the bank or look for a healthy merger partner and, ultimately, contribute to reduce 
the cost of deposit insurance.  In the EU, contrary to the case in the US, prudential 
supervisors have a limited range of legal powers to bring about early resolution without 
applying the general insolvency procedures to banks.   
Regarding the second element for an efficient implementation of PCA, an institutional 
framework supportive of prudential supervision disciplinary action is based on four 
preconditions, which, are in most instances called for by the Core Principles issued by the 
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision although they do not prescribe PCA.  
First, supervisors must have operational independence from the political and judicial 
systems. In the EU, prudential supervisors are either central banks or independent agencies 
that have achieved increasing political independence over the past two decades, which, 
through accountability, has been reconciled with the demands of democratic legitimacy.  
However, in some countries, formal consultation with government is required in matters of 
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internal procedure.  Also, the extent to which the supervisors are able to act independently of 
the judiciary varies by country. 
Second, supervisors must have access to a broad range of supervisory measures to 
bring about timely corrective action is another requirement for an effective PCA.   In some 
countries, supervisors do not have a full range of corrective actions, such as restricting asset 
transfers or suspending dividends.  In the recent entrants to the EU, the ability of the 
supervisor to address safety and soundness issues in banks is significantly encumbered by its 
institutional capacity and resources.  Furthermore, in a number of EU countries, government 
must formally approve the license withdrawal although the decision corresponds to the 
supervisor.  Hence, the “prompt” part of the PCA is not present.  
Third, the supervisors must be provided with adequate resolution procedures.  In the 
EU, Member States´ bank resolution procedures generally lack the flexibility of those available 
in the US, because of (1) the above mentioned limited range of supervisory measures to bring 
about resolution without applying to the courts and (2) the rigidities imposed by the general 
insolvency procedures applied to banks, which in some jurisdictions are an administered 
bankruptcy proceeding under the banking law.  In the case of credit institutions with cross-
border activity within the EU, Directive 2001/24/EC on the Reorganization and Winding up 
addresses some of the potential problems by enshrining the principles of mutual recognition, 
unity and universality.  Nonetheless, the Directive falls short of creating a framework of 
commonly accepted standards of bank resolution practice and, in particular, a common 
definition of bank insolvency and a fully-fledged single legal framework across the EU.   
Finally, prudential supervisors must have access to accurate and timely financial 
information on banks’ financial condition is also a pre condition for an effective PCA.  The 
accuracy of banks’ financial information depends on both the accounting principles used to 
measure capital and the enforcement of that those principles.  The EU is addressing this 
question by requiring banks to comply with the IFRS, developing common reporting 
requirements, and implementing methods for the data transmission in real time.  The more 
difficult problem to solve relate to giving the supervisors appropriate incentives to engage in 
timely action.  The U.S. experience since the adoption of PCA suggests that it may need to 
strengthen its supervisors’ incentives to demand honest accounting.   
In sum, although the existing EU legal framework generally supports the underlying 
philosophy of PCA, particularly with regard to limiting deposit insurance losses and mandatory 
prudential supervision at an early stage of banks financial problems.  However, PCA embeds 
some conceptual views about the operation of bank supervision and the mandatory closure 
at positive predetermined levels of regulatory capital ratios that have not been adopted by EU 
Member States.  Moreover, substantial changes would need to be made to the Member 
States’ institutional framework before the EU could adopt a version of PCA.  These 
institutional changes would be desirable even if the EU does not adopt PCA, but they are 
critical to the implementation of a PCA that is as effective as the PCA currently is in the US. 
  
 
Table 1. Objectives, autonomy and remedial measures of prudential supervisors: EU and rest of the world (*) 
Country Objectives and autonomy (BCP 1) Remedial Measures (BCP 22) Comments 
EU    
Germany The Prud. Sup. Authority is independent in its 
supervisory operations, albeit accountable to the MoF.  The 
assessment notes some issues where the scope of the role 
of the MoF is unclear, for instance its mandate to issue 
instructions to the  Prud. Sup. Authority, and the 
requirement that the Prud. Sup. Authority must consult the 
MoF in matters of internal procedures. 
The Prud. Sup. Authority  has a broad range of 
remedial measures at their disposal to counter  
weaknesses in banks, and they  use these measures 
frequently.  There is an implicit presumption in the 
legislation that adequate remedial action is taken promptly. 
Authorities are encouraged to make this presumption 
more explicit, in particular in severe cases. 
            Authorities point out that overly prescriptive 
rules could be counterproductive because they would 
reduce the room and incentives for 
taking discretionary decisions, which are better 
adapted to the specific circumstances, especially as 
the correct use of discretion is determined by general 
rules and legal limits. 
France Independence of banking supervision is generally 
adequate although the presence of the Head of Treasury on 
the board of the  Prud. Sup. Authority  could raise the issue 
of independence from the Government.  The legal protection 
of supervisors is a well recognized tenet of administrative law 
and is considered satisfactory.  
The Prud. Sup. Authority has the legal power to 
impose a broad range of remedial measures that range 
from recommendation to withdrawal of the license with or 
without appointment of a liquidator.  The Prud. Sup. 
Authority may impose the withdrawal of the voting rights of 
certain or all shares, the prohibition to pay dividends or 
other form of remunerations to shareholders and the 
obligation for the credit institution to disclose the 
disciplinary measures.  When imposing sanctions, the 
Prud. Sup. Authority is an administrative judicial authority, 
and its decisions and actions can only be challenged 
before the highest administrative authority.  
 
Italy The Prud. Sup. Authority takes the initiative in 
recommending regulatory and supervisory policy and it has 
operational independence on day-to-day application of 
supervisory methods.  The enforcement powers of  Prud. 
Sup. Authorities are satisfactory.  The law does not provide 
legal protection to its supervisors against court proceedings 
stemming from measures adopted in the performance of 
their functions in good faith. 
The Prud. Sup. Authority is able to activate a 
broad range of measures graduated according the 
seriousness of the problem bank's situation.  Nonetheless, 
it lacks specific provision to require subsequent removal of 
a director or senior officer who may have become unfit. 
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UK The Sup. Authority is independent in its 
supervisory activity and accountable to the Treasury 
Minister, and, through him, to Parliament. 
The Sup. Authority can take remedial action with 
immediate effect, using a supervisory notice.  The Sup. 
Authority may cancel a bank's permission and it has the 
authority to take disciplinary action against a bank or an 
individual, including fines and public censure.  It may also 
place requirements or restrictions on banks permission.  
This power can be used to require a bank to take (or 
refrain from taking) specified actions. 
 
The 
Netherlands 
The Bank Act gives the Sup. Authority powers to 
exercise supervision of financial institutions in accordance 
with applicable legislation. The legislation also provides the 
Ministry of Finance powers to exercise certain supervisory 
measures.  The objectives of the Sup. Authority are only 
implicitly embedded in the legislation rather than being 
explicitly set out and published. The new legislation will be an 
opportunity to strengthen this aspect and make 
accountability easier to measure.   
 
Though the legal powers given to the Sup. 
Authority are wide ranging and would appear to cover 
almost all (if not all) eventualities, more formalized 
measures are rarely used in practice. Notwithstanding, 
there are established procedures on how to implement such 
measures if called for. These measures tend to be 
persuasive and confidential in nature including the use of 
the ‘silent receiver’ in cases of substantial concern. This 
system appears to work effectively.  It can be questioned 
whether ‘penalties’ can be applied to management rather 
than just members of the Supervisory and Executive 
boards. 
 
Austria The Prud. Sup. Authority enjoys operational 
independence, and have a mandate clearly defined in law. 
There is legal protection for individual supervisors 
discharging their duties in good faith.  Court decisions may 
find the federal government liable for losses in a bank failure 
due to shortcomings of an external auditor performing 
supervisory duties prescribed in the banking act. 
A broad range of remedial powers is provided by 
law to the Sup. Authority, including explicit requirements to 
take prompt action in serious cases such as insolvency.  
The legal system puts a high burden of proof on the 
supervisor before action, which may subsequently be 
challenged in court. 
 
Sweden The Sup. Authority is an independent authority in 
performing its regulatory and supervisory functions and it has 
its own board.  The government yearly issues the Sup. 
Authority ´s general objectives after consulting with the Sup. 
Authority.  In order to achieve the overall objectives, Sup. 
Authority sets its operational goals and objectives without 
having to consult with the government.  Sup. Authority ´s 
employees can be considered to have legal protection for 
their actions taken in good faith in their office. 
The supervisor has a limited range of remedial 
actions available. In addition to issuing warnings and 
imposing conditional fines, the supervisor can revoke the 
license.  However, the supervisor should be able to take a 
more proactive approach with respect to remedial 
measures.  The supervisor is not empowered to take most 
of the measures enumerated in the essential criteria, e.g. 
restricting the scope of activities of a bank and 
suspending the payment of dividends. There are no laws 
or regulations that would mitigate against supervisory 
forbearance. 
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Finland The Sup. Authority has limited independence and 
accountability.  Independence is limited as the responsibility 
for the licensing and revocation of a bank remains with the 
MOF.  Accountability is limited as no authority is explicitly 
charged with supervising the Sup. Authority with regards to 
the effectiveness and appropriateness of its functions. 
The Sup. Authority  does not have the powers to 
require compliance with safety and soundness measures 
recommended by the supervisor;  powers to establish 
criteria for reviewing acquisitions and investments;  
powers to assess the adequacy of loan loss provisions 
and reserves; powers to require a higher minimum capital 
ratio; powers to control connected lending; and powers to 
bring about timely remedial action. Although the Sup. 
Authority participates in the resolution process for problem 
banks; it lacks powers to take prompt remedial action.  
The. Sup. Authority is for the most part focused on ex 
post reaction.   
 
Slovenia The Prud. Sup. Authority must be commended for 
the actions undertaken to enhance the regulatory regime 
and its endeavor to meet international standards.  However, 
the insufficiency of the salary must be addressed and the 
legal protection of the supervisory staff must be established. 
The Prud. Sup. Authority has the legal power  to 
restrict bank activity or a license or  to revoke a bank 
license. Prud. Sup. Authority has, inter alia, powers to 
object to potential controllers or shareholders of banks, 
and to existing controllers or shareholders.  In practice, the 
BoS seeks remedial action through informal means, 
principally through the use of moral suasion. 
 
Slovak 
Republic 
The legal framework for banking supervision is 
suitable and provides supervisory independence.  The 
banking Law has enhanced the supervisor's authority and 
ability to act, in part based on certain safety and soundness 
provisions.  However, the ability of the supervisor to address 
safety and soundness issues in banks is significantly 
encumbered by its institutional capacity.   
The banking Law provides a range of remedial 
actions to the supervisor, which if interpreted properly and 
affectively applied, offer the supervisor sufficient leverage 
and actions to oversee the banking sector.  In order to 
accomplish this, the overall practice of supervision must 
continue to be strengthened.  The willingness and 
capacity of the Sup. Authority to identify issues and to 
take timely and effective actions must still be 
demonstrated. 
 
Hungary The respective laws fully empower the Prud. Sup. 
Authority to address compliance with laws and all significant 
concerns of soundness and prudent management.  They 
empower, except for the extreme sanction of withdrawal of a 
license, the Prud. Sup. Authority to take or impose prompt 
remedial action whenever, in its judgment, a bank is not 
complying with laws and regulations or is (at risk of) 
engaging in any unsafe or unsound practice.  Supervisors 
enjoy full protection under the civil service acts for all acts 
performed in exercising their professional duties.  The MoF is 
responsible for the licensing and exit policies.  
Although the Prud. Sup. Authority has remedial 
tools at its disposal; they are not directed at reinforcing the 
responsibilities of the board and senior management to 
prudently oversee the safe and sound operation of the 
bank and the consolidated company.  Supervisors cannot 
remove board members and senior management.  
Recourse to remedial actions is predicated on an 
institution being in a crisis or pre-crisis mode. 
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European non-EU    
Switzerland There appears to be a lack of administrative 
independence with regard to the Prud. Sup. Authority ´s 
budget, which is incorporated into the Finance 
Ministry's Budget. 
The banking Law provides a range of 
remedial actions, including the withdrawal of the 
bank's license.  There is no mechanism for the 
automatic imposition of administrative or penal 
sanctions, as under Swiss law such sanctions require 
the conduct of legal proceedings.  The proposed 
amendment to the banking Law will codify the Prud. 
Sup Authority ´s current practices and will explicitly 
empower it, for instance: 
o To suspend/dismiss managers or directors 
if bank solvency is under threat 
o To alter reduce or terminate any activity 
that poses excessive risk, or restrict an 
institution's business activities; or 
o To impose temporary management and 
reorganization measures. 
The Prud. Sup. Authority has no explicit 
legal basis for publicly disclosing enforcement actions 
naming institutions and individuals. 
 
Norway Laws provide a clear framework, objectives 
and responsibilities for carrying out bank supervision. 
However, the institutional arrangements among MOF 
and Prud. Sup. Authority need to be strengthened in 
order to preserve and increase the actual and perceived 
authority and independence of the Prud. Sup. Authority. 
Several remedial tools specifically backed 
by legal authority should be added: 
o To force financial institutions to arrange good 
risk management practices. 
o To order explicit restrictions on financial 
institutions. in unsatisfactory condition 
withholding approval to open new offices, 
expand into new products, or acquire new 
businesses 
o To empower  Prud. Sup. with authority  to set 
adequate individual loan loss provisions. 
            Authorities point out that 
decisions taken by the MoF will 
always be based on a 
recommendation from Prud. Sup. 
Authority, which always will be 
available to an applicant, and 
normally will be publicly available. 
Thus a decision taken by the MoF 
will be much more transparent 
than a decision taken by the Prud. 
Sup. Authority 
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Rest of the World    
Canada            The banking Law provides legislated authority for 
the Prud. Sup. Authority to address compliance with laws 
and safety and soundness of banks. Legislation gives Prud. 
Sup operational independence. However, the MoF has 
some formal powers to overrule the Prud. Sup. Authority 
on chartering and some banking policy issues.  
Although the Prud. Sup. Authority has a wide 
array of sanctions at his disposal; it does not have the 
authority to bar an individual from banking once the 
person has been hired. The Prud. Sup. Authority is 
subject to the external control of the General 
Accounting Office. 
 
Japan Although the removal of responsibility for 
supervision from the MoF and the setting up of the 
unified Sup. Authority was a major step forward, there 
appears to be lack of operational independence.  The 
constitutional framework of the Sup. Authority -with a 
minister who effectively has control over the operations 
of the supervisor- creates scope for the Sup. Authority 
to be subject to political pressures.  
The Sup. Authority is authorized to take an 
appropriate range of actions against a bank that 
requires remedial measures.  The actions range from 
submission of business improvement plans to 
revocation of the license.  Sanctions apply also to the 
board of directors, auditors and managers for 
violation of the banking Law, including failure to 
observe corrective orders. 
 
Mexico  Even though the legal framework establishes 
the Prud. Sup. Authority as the single authority 
responsible for banking regulation and supervision, in 
reality the regulatory responsibility is shared with other 
institutions.  This fragmentation of powers weakens 
accountability and enforcement of rules and regulations.  
Political interference in decision making and budgetary 
constrains undermine the operational independence of 
the Prud. Sup. Authority.   
There is a system of prompt corrective 
action in place  that would allow the Prud. Sup. 
Authority to take remedial action  in a timely fashion.  
 
Korea The operational independence of the. 
Authority is embodied in law, however, in practice some 
practices such as the MoF interpretations of 
regulations, have called that independence into 
question.  The Sup. Authority and its staff lack of 
statutory protection against lawsuits for actions 
performed while discharging their duties in good faith.  
There is a full range of remedial actions that 
can be taken against banks.  However, there is scope 
to strengthen and clarify the. Sup. Authority powers 
to initiate enforcement actions. The. Sup. Authority is 
not empowered to remove employees of financial 
institutions. 
Authorities point out 
that the lack of clarity in the roles 
of agencies overseeing the 
financial sector promotes an 
effective system of checks and 
balances. 
 
(*) Observance of the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.  IMF-WB Assessments available in the web site 
 (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/search.aspx?filter_val=N&NewQuery=basle+core+principles+banking+supervision&col=SITENG&collection=&lan=eng). 
 These institutional arrangements may have changed since the date of the assessment.  
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